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1100016 New deepwater quay unlocks future for UK’s premier fish port
By Peter Martin and Roy Glenton (November 2011) 
Contribution by Nick Davies
Martin and Glenton (2011) are to be 
congratulated on both a well-presented 
paper and a well-considered solution. I 
am interested to know, however, why 
structural steel was chosen for the 
down-stand beam. Elsewhere, good 
consideration was given to maintenance 
and corrosion protection. However, 
the complex open structure of the 
rear of the beam could not have been 
easy to paint to the high standard 
needed. Indeed, future inspection and 
maintenance painting of the beam 
will not be simple. Was a concrete 
solution, perhaps using a combination 
of precast elements with an in situ core, 
considered? This could have had cleaner 
lines and, properly constructed, provided 
a longer maintenance-free life and simple 
inspection routines.
Authors’ reply
The front down-stand beam is a 
concrete-filled steel U beam. It is 
unpainted as it is designed for occasional 
impact from small vessels nosing into it 
between the cone fenders and it was felt 
that painting would not be worthwhile. 
Both the front and rear vertical plates are 
flush with the bottom plate at the corners 
with no outstands and it is expected that 
corrosion of the steel, which has been 
allowed for with a sacrificial thickness, 
will be relatively uniform over the surface 
of the plates.
Using a steel beam greatly facilitated 
erection of the main box girders as each 
segment of the down-stand effectively 
stabilised the pair of girders to which the 
segment was connected, allowing very 
rapid erection of the steel framework. 
The beam was supplied with internal 
bracing to hold the shape, and to stabilise 
the vertical web plates when placing the 
concrete infill. 
For the permanent condition, the beam 
was designed as a composite member 
with shear connectors on the inside of 
the webs providing for full composite 
action and the concrete infill is integral 
with the deck concrete. It plays an 
important role in the structural action 
of the deck system as its considerable 
vertical stiffness distributes local patch 
loading from heavy-lift cranes over a 
number of main beams and it has a high 
horizontal resistance for vessel impact. 
We believe that the benefits of the 
concrete-filled steel down-stand beam, 
both for erection and service conditions, 
would have been difficult to obtain from 
precast or in situ concrete construction.
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1100021 Embodied carbon dioxide as a design tool – a case study
By David Knight and Bill Addis (November 2011) 
Contribution by Adrian Campbell
I welcome the addition by Knight 
and Addis (2011) to the debate on 
embodied energy and its importance to 
the development of more sustainable 
building design. There is an increasing 
trend towards broader scopings of carbon 
dioxide, with embodied impacts being 
one step along that pathway. The key 
issue for the engineering profession is to 
what extent does it wish to engage in 
that trend and use it as part of its normal 
judgements of overall what is best to 
build. I would be worried, therefore, if 
the profession did follow the authors’ 
recommendation to hand the topic over 
to quantity surveyors. My experience 
is that engineers are actually better 
placed to deal with the issues of material 
selection between options, specification 
issues within materials and the influence 
on overall building system design, which 
all require a greater familiarity with the 
issues behind the data. The increasing 
use of analysis tools that model 
extensive parts of structure and building 
information modelling (BIM), makes many 
elements of initial quantity estimation 
a part of the general design process 
anyway. Rather than generate another 
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consulting specialism for clients to pay 
for, we should be making carbon dioxide 
assessment an inherent part of the overall 
design method of the engineer, with 
simple tools to allow early analysis and 
judgement. This is where the difference is 
really made.
Authors’ reply
We agree with the contributor’s desire to 
use embodied energy calculations as part 
of the engineering design process. As 
he points out, the increasing use of BIM 
and other tools to determine quantities 
of materials makes this easier to achieve. 
However, it is unusual for current BIM 
models to include materials other than 
steel and concrete and so they would miss 
out aspects of the total embodied carbon 
dioxide. We note that the process of 
gathering the data required for embodied 
energy calculation is very similar to the 
process for quantifying materials for a 
cost report, and suggest that for simplicity 
the two are progressed in parallel, with 
decisions based on the outcomes made by 
the engineering design team. As tools and 
BIM models progress, we would expect 
this process (and simple cost estimation) 
to be further integrated into the design 
process. 
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1000058 Tricky truss: design and construction of bridge GE19, London
By David Collings and Lucio Chiodi (November 2011) 
Contribution by Frank Marples
The paper by Collings and Chiodi 
(2011) correctly recognises the need for 
a specialist designer with experience 
of major launched truss bridges and 
this requirement can be applied to all 
launched bridges. The paper covers 
many aspects of the design but leaves 
several key areas requiring clarification. 
The report by Department of Transport’s 
rail accident investigation branch 
(RAIB, 2009) raised four causal and ten 
contributory factors to the failure, not 
just two. Three of the four causal factors 
and eight contributory factors could 
have been addressed by the designer, 
either by sequence drawings or by an 
outline methodology, and it is thought 
that discussion of these factors would 
have been more informative. 
Propulsion was provided by strand 
jacks but how were these synchronised 
with the self-propelled modular transport 
units, which provide further motive 
force? Permanent articulation for the 
bridge is addressed but the designer 
appears not to have specified the bearing 
restraints during the re-positioning 
and jack-down stages. These events 
should have been addressed as required 
by the CDM Regulations (designer’s 
responsibilities; HMG, 2007) and they are 
identified as key issues by RAIB. This final 
point and the RAIB’s other causal and 
contributory factors have been addressed 
by Marples (2012).
Authors’ reply
The contributor notes that a specialist 
designer should be used for launched 
bridges, but we would go further and say 
that a competent designer must be used 
on all forms of bridges. We would note 
that personnel in major consultants and 
contractors change, and clients should 
ensure that the curricula vitae of staff 
carrying out the design (and construction) 
are relevant, rather than rely on brochures 
and marketing literature.
The contributor outlines comments 
in the RIAB report on the incident, but 
it is worth quoting the report to get 
things in context. The key finding was, 
‘the immediate cause of the incident 
was concrete planks falling from the 
partly completed deck … triggered by a 
sudden movement of the deck.’ The key 
causal factor for the planks falling was, 
‘the decision to substitute the positive 
tie between individual precast concrete 
permanent formwork planks with cement 
mortar’ – hence our comment on risk 
assessments and the perceptions of risk. 
on the project the risk was not 
identified formally by the client’s 
designer, the risk was identified and 
mitigated by the specialist designer in its 
risk assessment. However, the risk was 
reviewed and different perceptions of risk 
and mitigation given by the temporary 
works designer. 
The key causal factor for the 
sudden movement was failure of the 
temporary bearing system due to, ‘a) 
… lack of design input to the deck 
repositioning activity … b) unauthorised 
modification of the temporary supports 
by introducing an additional sliding 
surface … c) installation of lubricated 
PTFE faced slipper pads on a gradient’. 
The introduction of an additional 
sliding plane was clearly an issue of site 
management, exacerbated by the lack 
of detailed drawings of the temporary 
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bearing layout. That an item of design 
can be missed out when there was 
a series of designers, checkers and 
consultants whose sole remit was railway 
safety, makes the authors wonder if such 
projects have become too bureaucratic 
and merely a tick-box exercise. We note 
that the correspondent has a paper 
outlining improved management controls 
and we look forward to reading this.
The correspondent had a question on 
the use of the self-propelled modular 
transport unit. The bridge was originally 
intended to be pulled by strands from 
the east abutment with the rear of the 
bridge supported on a series of trestles, 
without the use of a transport unit. The 
introduction of the unit to the rear meant 
that the trestles could be omitted, with 
the unit simply being a movable trestle; 
no motive force to the truss was provided 
by the transport unit. 
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1100004 Understanding the behaviour of energy geo-structures
By Lyesse Laloui and Alice Di Donna (November 2011) 
Contribution by John Parker
Laloui and Di Donna (2011) state in 
Figure 7 and the accompanying text that 
the test pile’s factor of safety decreased 
to 0·7 on being heated by 14ºC. This 
was partly because expansion increased 
load at the top of the pile from 700 kN 
to 1700 kN. Was this because the test 
pile was the only pile in the structure 
that was heated, and load was being 
transferred from other piles? If all piles 
were heated, loads applied to the top 
would not change greatly because the 
building weight would remain constant. 
Would this cause the 14ºC curve to 
reduce by 1000 kN throughout, leading 
to a (more acceptable) factor of safety of 
approximately 2?
Authors’ reply
The case considered in Figure 7 is 
an in situ pile test run at the Ecole 
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne 
(Laloui et al., 2003). In the experimental 
set-up only the test pile was subject to 
thermal loading, while the other piles 
around it were not equipped as energy 
piles. In the particular case of a single 
heated pile, the thermal dilation of the 
pile is more constrained at the head by 
the slab due to the fact that the other 
piles do not dilate. This leads to the 
strong increase of the load at the head 
of the pile and consequently to the 
important reduction of the safety factor. 
Figure 1 from a forthcoming paper by 
Kazangba, Dupray and Laloui, provisionally 
titled ‘Numerical study of a seasonal 
thermo-piles energy storage’, compares the 
stresses induced in a pile when only the 
row of piles to which it belongs is heated 
with the case where the whole group of 
piles is heated. Considering that the stress 
induced in this simulation in the same 
pile by the mechanical load, averaged on 
its length, is about 3 MPa, the thermal 
stress is about 15% of the mechanical 
load when all piles are heated and about 
30% of the mechanical load when only 
one row of piles is heated. one could 
therefore conclude that when a group 
of piles is heated the safety factor will be 
less affected compared to the case of one 
isolated energy pile. However, in the case 
where all the piles are heated together, the 
slab constraint is still present, even if less 
strongly. Consequently, the reduction of the 
safety factor is a realistic problem which has 
to be considered in design practice. 
The pile mentioned in Figure 7 of our 
paper is an extreme case which aims to 
underline the phenomena happening 
in the energy piles when subjected to a 
thermo-mechanical loading. Moreover, it 
has to be said that if one considers the 
other extreme case in which the pile is 
completely free to move, the state of stress 
will not be influenced by temperature, 
but the thermal displacements will be 
more important and could threaten the 
performance of the building above during 
its normal working life. In this second 
case, the safety factor at the ultimate limit 
state will not change, but the effects of 
temperature will become more relevant at 
the serviceability limit state. 
In conclusion, the optimised solution is 
probably a compromise between the two 
extreme cases discussed, which should 
ensure both admissible displacements for 
the structure and stresses for the piles.
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Numerical modelling of a group of piles 
comparing the case of one row of piles heated 
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